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In the European Union, energy markets are increasingly being liberalized. A case in point is 
the European natural gas industry. The general expectation is that more competition will lead 
to lower prices and higher volumes, and hence higher welfare. This paper indicates that this 
might not happen for at least two reasons. First, energy markets, including the market for 
natural gas, are characterized by imperfect competition and increasing costs to develop new 
energy sources. As a result, new entrants in the market are less efficient than incumbent firms. 
Second, energy markets, again including the market for natural gas, are associated with 
capacity constraints. Prices are determined in residual markets where the least efficient firms 
are active. This is likely to lead to price increases, rather than decreases. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1990s, market liberalization is a popular instrument in Europe to increase 
social welfare. The argument is that liberalized markets are associated with intensified 
competition. Economic theory predicts that more competition will produce lower 
prices and higher outputs (cf. Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982).
1 Together, all this is 
to the benefit of consumers, both in the short and the long run, and hence is argued to 
increase social welfare. In this paper, we will reflect on this logic for the case of 
energy markets in general, and the European natural gas industry in particular. The 
point we want to make is not that economic theory is wrong, but rather that the kind 
of economic predictions the European Union (EU) is referring to are conditional. That 
is, it critically depends upon the idiosyncratic conditions of the market at hand 
whether or not liberalization will produce the intended outcomes. As we hope to 
illustrate below, energy and gas are likely not to be associated with the required 
conditions. If that is taken into account, then economic theory will predict that 
liberalization will not produce lower prices, but is rather likely to be associated with 
higher prices.
2 Hence, if we are right, this implies not so much that economic theory is 
wrong, but rather that European policymakers are besides the mark. 
  If economic theory is to be used to understand competition in a particular 
industry, key is to first identify the specific conditions that characterize this particular 
industry. This is a well-established observation in the microeconomic theory of 
competition, also known as industrial organization, or IO (see, e.g., Tirole, 1988; van 
Witteloostuijn and Boone, 2006). For instance, if firms compete in prices (Bertrand) 
                                                 
1 Strictly speaking, there is more to it than lower prices and higher outputs alone. Key is the distinction 
between so-called static vis-à-vis dynamic efficiency (cf. van Witteloostuijn, 1992). The former refers 
to prices and volumes, and the latter to process and product innovations. Here, we focus on static 
efficiency only. 
2 This implies that we focus on specific types of outcomes of the liberalization of the European natural 
gas market: prices and quantities. Another, and related, outcome variable is gas supply security. Wright 
(2005) offers a critical analysis of the liberalization-security link.   4
rather than volumes (Cournot), cartel-like outcomes are much less likely to emerge. 
What policy intervention tends to do, which is certainly true for liberalization, is to 
change the very conditions that characterize the industry at hand. Hence, before we 
proceed, it is essential to identify the characteristics we believe are typical for the 
European natural gas market. We do so in Section 2. The next step is to diagnose what 
changes in which conditions the EU’s intervention will imply. This is done in Section 
3. We are then ready to develop an IO model of competition that features the 
industry’s essential conditions, and to analyze what the intended changes in these 
conditions will do to prices and volumes, in Section 4. In Section 5, we systematically 
reflect on the model outcomes. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The European Gas Industry’s Critical Conditions 
Starting point of any IO analysis that is expected to capture a real-world industry is 
the definition of the industry at hand. For our purposes, we limit attention to natural 
gas production, by and large. Of course, the gas industry is much more complicated 
than that. For instance, gas production is often in the hands of other parties than gas 
distribution. In principle, each part of the gas industry’s value chain will feature its 
own competitive dynamics, which may differ from one Member State to the other (cf. 
Brakman, van Marrewijk and van Witteloostuijn, 2007). So, any IO model of 
competition in the gas industry, inevitably, involves simplifying assumptions that help 
to focus on the essence, given the question at hand. In our case, we believe that gas 
production is key to understand the effect of liberalization on competition in the EU’s   5
gas industry.
3 After all, gas production generates the volumes with which other parties 
within the industry value chain have to work. 
We believe that three conditions are essential in the European natural gas 
production industry – or gas industry, for short (cf. Clingendael International Energy 
Programme, 2008, and the many references therein). The first condition relates to 
IO’s key distinction between price and output, or Bertrand and Cournot, competition. 
Of course, many industries feature aspects of both Bertrand and Cournot (Kreps and 
Scheinkman, 1983). This is not different in the gas industry. On the one hand, gas 
auction markets are clearly Cournot. On the other hand, gas delivery contracts involve 
Bertrand. However, the question is which competitive instrument takes center stage. 
Gas is, by and large, a homogeneous product that is brought to the market by not so 
many producers in large volumes. The number of producers is rather limited, with 
Algeria, the Netherlands, Norway and Russia as Europe’s key players. In each 
country, a (partially) state-owned monopolist is in charge of gas production. 
Therefore, as do Egging and Gabriel (2006), we assume that the Cournot oligopoly 
model with product homogeneity best reflects the nature of the European gas 
(production) industry.  
The second condition relates to the issue of efficiency. Gas suppliers can be 
ranked in terms of efficiency for at least three reasons. First, as in any industry, not all 
firms are equally efficient. For instance, a Western private-public joint venture such 
as Dutch Gasunie tends to be more efficient than a state-run monopolist such as 
Russian Gazprom. Second, the cost of gas production varies from one field to the 
other, depending upon the geophysical circumstances. In effect, gas production is 
associated with increasing costs to develop new gas fields. Third, local costs increase 
                                                 
3 For a sophisticated example of a (simulation) model of the European natural gas market that 
distinguishes between different types of players, we refer to Egging, Gabriel, Holz and Zhuang (2008).   6
with distance. With nearby gas fields depleting quickly, natural gas has to travel 
longer distances in the future. Figure 1 provides an example of the gas supply cost 
curve for the EU15, as predicted for 2020 (OME, 2002; Hafner, 2008). 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Gas suppliers differ wildly in terms of efficiency (cf. Lochner and Bothe, 2009). 
Algerian Medgaz’s efficiency is expected to be about $1.1 per MBtu in 2020, whereas 
Russia’s Shtockman supply is estimated to cost approximately $2.9 per MBtu by 
2020. Indeed, the efficiency gap is estimated to be of similar size in 2010 (OME, 
2002: Diagram 5 on page 14). In effect, the data reveal a clear pattern. Using Figure 
1’s data, we can estimate the linear gas supply cost curve depicted in Figure 2. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
On the basis of these estimates, a linear approximation explains about 98 per cent of 
the variance in marginal costs.  
The third condition involves capacities. That is, gas production cannot be 
expanded indefinitely. By way of illustration, Table 1 lists the (expected) export 
potential of Europe’s three major suppliers: Algeria, Norway, and Russia and Central 
Asia (Hafner, 2008). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Not very surprisingly, this table reveals that each and every gas producer faces 
capacity constraints. For instance, the export capacity of Russia and Central Asia, 
Europe’s largest supplier, is expected to be 166 bcm in 2010 and 207 bcm in 2030. 
After all, natural gas is a nonrenewable natural resource, implying that the reserves 
are finite by definition.
4 Although new reserves are discovered on an annual basis, 
                                                 
4 Distribution capacity can imply an extra constraint. However, in principle, this constraint can be 
relaxed by building extra pipelines. Indeed, a variety of pipeline-building initiatives are either under 
way or negotiated about. However, in the end, the reserves capacity is binding. Moreover, pipeline 
development implies a costly and time-consuming investment.   7
which partly explains the predicted increase in capacities, unavoidably gas producers 
will hit the upper limit of what they can produce, at some point. Note that the binding 
nature of the constraints is expected to increase over time for two reasons. First, the 
discovery and exploitation of new gas fields is characterized by decreasing returns, as 
is witnessed by Table 1’s stepwise reduction in extra capacities per gas producer over 
time. Second, the opposite can be observed for European gas demand, which 
continues to grow in decades to come (Kjärstad and Johnsson, 2007; Remme, Blesl 
and Fahl, 2008). Total demand for gas in the European market is increasing. The main 
reason for this upward trend, ignoring business cycle-driven slumps, is the increasing 
demand from power plants as is revealed in Figure 3. The environmental advantage of 
gas over coal or oil-fuelled power plants is one of the main reasons for this trend. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
  The above suggests three critical conditions, which we translate into 
assumptions that will form the starting point for our modeling effort in Sections 4 and 
5. 
 
Assumption 1: The European natural gas industry is a Cournot (output) 
oligopoly.  
Assumption 2: Europe’s gas suppliers can be ranked in terms of increasing 
inefficiency.  
Assumption 3: All of Europe’s gas suppliers face a binding capacity 
constraint.  
   8
3. The EU’s Gas Industry Liberalization Policy 
With the implementation of the Gas Directive (EU, 1998), the European gas market is 
moving toward further liberalization. This implies that the market for gas suppliers is 
changing drastically. Parallel to this development, the national gas markets in the 
Member States are being liberalized, though at different speeds. France, for example, 
is only reluctantly opening its domestic market to foreign competitive forces. In the 
Netherlands, the government has gone a step further than required by dismantling the 
so-called Gasgebouw (“gas building”). This was done in order to anticipate and 
facilitate the larger process of European natural gas market liberalization. The 
ultimate aim of liberalization of the gas market is to let demand and supply of gas 
determine the market-clearing equilibrium price so that efficiency will be increased, 
price will be reduced and customer choice will be expanded. Since different energy 
sources are to a certain extent substitutes, a certain degree of correlation between 
prices of different energy sources will always remain in place, reflecting the longer-
term ability to substitute between them. However, as a consequence of liberalization, 
the close relationship between gas and oil prices should diminish over time.  
In the EU, as indicated above, the EU Gas Directive (EU, 1998) has set out the 
path for liberalization of the gas industry by defining the regulatory space within 
which each Member State can search for a position. The key features of the Gas 
Directive are the following four.  
1.  There is a third-party access requirement. Member States must allow certain 
gas customers to buy gas from the supplier of their choice and to have it 
transported through the existing pipeline network at negotiated or regulated 
rates. Initially, this right will only be available to very large gas customers. For 
the first five years, only customers taking at least 25 million cubic metres of   9
gas per year will be eligible. For the next five years, the eligibility set will be 
expanded to customers demanding at least 15 million cubic metres annually. 
In the final three years, the threshold reduces to 5 million cubic metres per 
annum.  
2.  Member States can choose between negotiated access and regulated access. 
Under negotiated access, individual customers enter into negotiations to 
determine the precise terms. Under regulated access, gas customers have a 
right of access on the basis of published regulated tariffs. Member States are 
required to “designate competent authorities, independent of the parties, with 
access to the internal accounts of the natural gas undertakings to settle access 
disputes expeditiously.”  
3.  The Gas Directive also requires unbundling: “Natural gas undertakings are 
required to keep separate accounts in their internal accounting at least for their 
gas transmission, distribution, storage and consolidated non-gas activities as 
they would be required to do if the activities were carried out by separate 
undertakings.”
5  
4.  Member States are allowed to impose public service obligations on gas 
utilities, which may relate to security of supply, regularity, quality and price of 
supplies, as well as to issues of environmental protection. Natural gas 
undertakings “may refuse access to their system on the basis of lack of 
capacity, or where the access to the system would prevent them from carrying 
out the public service obligations that are assigned to them by the Member 
State”, or “if this would cause serious economic and financial difficulties with 
take-or-pay contracts”. 
                                                 
5 Note that EU’s standpoint on unbundling has recently been relaxed.   10
So, although the EU has launched its Gas Directive, it is not clear how its detailed 
implementation will work out in practice, as there is substantial room for 
manoeuvring at the national level. That is, each Member State can carefully balance 
the pros and cons of different regulatory options, which is quite likely to produce 
significant intra-EU diversity.    
  At present, the natural gas industry in Europe is largely characterized by 
national transmission monopolies, directly supplying about half of the total gas 
market, and a large number of regional distribution monopolies. The largest gas 
reserves that are directly connected to the EU-pipeline infrastructure are those of 
Algeria, Norway, Russia, the Netherlands, and the UK (with the UK losing ground 
quickly, as it is running out of its gas reserves).
6 In contrast, the US industry involves 
a greater degree of vertical separation. In the US, there are a large number of gas 
producers, and the degree of integration between production and transmission 
pipelines is small. Many transmission pipelines are owned by wholesalers, which are 
subject to a complicated regulatory regime. The OECD (2000: 28) notes that “all gas 
prices have had a tendency to rise over the last decade in most OECD countries, they 
have declined in Canada and the UK, two countries which have liberated the gas 
industry during that time period.” This observation offers a rationale for the EU’s 
liberalization policy. However, can the British and Canadian historical experience be 
simply applied to the EU of the future?  
Countries that had introduced competition in their natural gas markets by the 
late 1990s include Argentina, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US, 
all via third-party access to their pipeline and storage infrastructures. The experiences 
of those countries are, according to the IEA (2000: 40), that “regulatory reforms have 
                                                 
6 This is ceteris paribus, given known reserves and the current cross-Europe pipeline infrastructure, 
and ignoring liquid gas import. In the longer run, the UK will be out of reserves, whilst the Middle East 
may find easier ways to penetrate the European market.   11
yielded identifiable benefits in the form of increased customer choice, broader ranges 
as well as better quality of services, and lower end-user prices ... reliability of supply 
has been maintained ... open access has eliminated previously existing monopoly rents 
in gas supply ... and passed these cost savings, at least in part, to (eligible) 
consumers.” 
Yet, price volatility has increased, as measured by the day-to-day percentage 
difference in the price of the commodity, especially since prices can be very high 
when demand peaks. The IEA (2000: 45-46) also lists some problems. These concern 
“dynamic inefficiencies in the regulated system with system extension and 
maintenance of quality standards; [the] need for extremely complex and therefore 
costly metering and dispatching technology on the entire system in order to keep a 
minimum reliable basis for cost calculation; economic costs due to higher risk for 
potential long-term investors and risk of reduction in long-term investment; 
inefficiencies caused by arbitrary allocation of fixed costs or the unbundling of 
economies of scope; increased transaction costs; [and] high regulatory costs.”  
In addition, the political accountability of regulating authorities may pose 
problems. The IEA (2000: 48) concludes that “[o]verall, the benefits in terms of end-
user prices that have been achieved are the results of intense gas-to-gas competition 
and gas (commodity) trading. However, whether the access regulation and tarification 
itself has contributed to this, i.e. whether it has lowered the cost and the price of 
transport, is much less clear.” Hence, even on the basis of experiences elsewhere in 
the world and an evaluation of an authority such as the IEA, it may well turn out that 
the unconditional belief in the dominant benefits of liberalization is naive. In the next 
sections, we add further arguments that may fuel this doubt.    12
The bottom line is that the rhetoric of the EU claims that liberalization will 
push gas prices down due to the competitive pressure imposed upon the players in a 
freed marketplace. However, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, as the outcome 
of liberalization very much depends upon the gas industry’s underlying conditions, 
and how these may change as a result of liberalization. In this respect, the gas price 
data presented by Robinson (2007) are revealing. In the 2000s, gas prices went up, 
rather than down. The model we will present next offers an explanation for this 
finding. It is important to note that our claim is not that competitive forces are not 
important, but that the structure of markets like those of the Gas markets is such that 
price increases are in practice likely. 
 
4. A Stylized Model of Competition 
A general Cournot model 
We start by taking the conditions that characterize the EU’s natural gas industry 
seriously. First, the EU gas market is best characterized by competition between a 
limited number of suppliers that primarily compete in output (Assumption 1), given 
the low number of gas-producing countries. Second, gas suppliers can be ranked in 
terms of increasing inefficiency (Assumption 2), due to technological reasons. Third, 
production of gas is limited by capacity constraints (Assumption 3), determined by 
the gas fields’ reserves. To start with, we suggest a model framework of Cournot 
competition with capacity constraints. 
In the first place, we cannot emphasize enough that, by its very structural 
nature, the natural gas industry is associated with imperfect competition, even after 
liberalization – i.e., a Cournot oligopoly. Furthermore, as we argued above, energy 
markets in general, and so also the natural gas market, are characterized by capacity   13
constraints. These capacity constraints consist basically of two elements. First, in 
order to produce gas, new gas fields have to be developed, which is the most 
expensive part of gas production. Second, gas has to be distributed. The transport 
network has limited capacity (in terms of pipelines and hubs) that cannot be extended 
at will, but requires relatively large and time-consuming investments. 
These two conditions combined ensure that the European gas market is best 
described by Cournot oligopoly competition with capacity constraints. Below, we 
analyze what this implies for the likely effect of liberalization. Specifically, we 
explore potential effects of liberalization by means of a limited number of illustrative 
scenario analyses, where liberalization is defined as an increase in the number of 
firms active in the market. In so doing, we can assess the likely impact of 
liberalization on static efficiency – i.e., prices and volumes. Our stylized model, by 
definition and by necessity, ignores many details. However, we believe that the model 
below offers ample opportunities to develop insight into the main (static efficiency) 
consequences of the liberalization process that is under way within the EU. It is our 
contention that the effects of capacity constraints are often neglected. As a 
consequence, the public tends to be disappointed by the effects of liberalization of the 
gas market, particularly, and energy market more generally.  
Define N  as the number of firms
7 active in the market in equilibrium, i as the 
sub-index that indicates firm i, i K  as the cost function given in Eq. (1) below, F as 
fixed cost, c as marginal cost, and x as the quantity produced.
8 So, liberalization 
implies a larger N. The linear demand function is given in Eq. (2), where P is price 
and X is total supply.  
                                                 
7 Strictly speaking, given the logic of our model, “firms” refer to gas fields that differ in capacity and 
efficiency (see below). So, different firms / fields might be owned by the same company. This subtlety 
is not relevant in the context of our model. 
8 The equilibrium as specified only holds, of course, if all firms produce non-negative output and make 
non-negative profits. See below for more details on the restrictions this imposes.    14
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Firms maximize their own profits, according to Eq. (4) below, by choosing their 
production level, taking the production level of other firms as given. The first-order-
condition is given in Eq. (5), where  i x−  means not firm i production – that is, 
i i x X x − = − : the production by all other firms in the market. The reaction curves can 
be written as Eq. (6), and solving gives Eq. (7).  
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Firm i’s solution, the market equilibrium price and production level are given in 
   15
(8) 
) 1 /( ) (
) 1 /( ) (
,.., 1 , ) 1 /( ) (
+ + =
+ − =





N c a P
b N c Na X









Note that, in equilibrium, we have  i i bx c P = − ) ( . So, profits for firm i are given by 
i i i F bx − =
2 π  – i.e., they are proportional to the square of output minus fixed costs.  
 
Rising inefficiency without capacity constraints 
By way of steppingstone, we first assume that capacity constraints are absent. This 
implies that, in principle, each and every firm could serve the whole market. We are 
now ready to introduce Assumption 3, inter-firm efficiency differences, by 
introducing the following more specific cost structure, reflecting the rise in marginal 
production costs:  i i i x i F x K κ λ ) 1 2 ( ) ( + ⋅ + = . The idea behind this specification is 
that we can rank firms according to (marginal) efficiency. The parameter λ reflects the 
increase in inefficiency as measured by marginal costs if another firm becomes active 
in the market (expressed as [twice] the percentage of the marginal costs of a 
hypothetical firm 0), while κ is an inverse measure of the general efficiency of the 
market. Depending on market conditions or the maturity of the market, these 
parameters can change. Consequently, we have 
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which can be substituted in Eq. (8) to give   16
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This gives Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1 (Rising inefficiency results in price increases): In the absence of 




It follows trivially from Eq. (10) that markets characterized by increasing inefficiency 
of (additional) firms (that is, positive values of λ) raise price relative to markets in 
which these inefficiencies are absent. For the gas market, these increasing 
inefficiencies are a fact of life (cf. Figure 2). The interesting question is what the 
likely effect of liberalization in such markets will be. One can expect a balance 
between increasing inefficiency that leads to price increases (Proposition 1) versus 
more competition that – in principle – leads to price decreases. Proposition 2a says 
that the competition effect dominates. 
 
                                                 
9 Our model implies, as a by-product of the Cournot oligopoly with product homogeneity assumption, 
that market prices within the EU converge. Indeed, Robinson (2007) reports evidence in support of 
such convergence. Moreover, his Figure 1 (on page 2348) reveals increasing prices in the 2000s – a 
stylized fact in line with our model outcome as well (see below).   17
Proposition 2a (Rationality of competition policy): In the absence of capacity 
constraints, market liberalization (an increase in the number of firms) leads to 
higher output and lower price if the following condition is fulfilled: 
λκ κ / ) ( ) 1 (
2 − < + a N.  
 
Proposition 2a follows directly from differentiating the market Eq. (10) with respect 
to N. From Eq. (2) it follows that if market output rises, the market price decreases. 
The proposition states that the (square of) the number of firms weighted by the 
incremental increase in inefficiency cannot be too high. So, competition policy works 
in the sense that increased competition reduces market price, but only up to a point. 
Potentially, if the (marginal) costs of taking additional gas fields into production 
become too high, price will increase despite competition. Whether or not this effect is 
economically important is discussed below. Eq. (10) also explains the opposition of 
incumbent firms against market liberalization, as is reflected in Proposition 2b. 
 
Proposition 2b (Competition policy and incumbent firms): In the absence of 
capacity constraints, market liberalization (a rise in the number of firms from 
0 N t o   1 N ) leads to lowers sales and profits for incumbent firms if, and only if, 
the following condition holds:  λκ κ / ) ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 0 − < + + a N N . 
 
Proposition 2b follows from the equilibrium sales for individual firms in Eq. (10). Let 
the number of firms in the market rise from  0 N t o   1 N . Let  j i x ,  be firm i’s sales if 
there are  j N  firms active in the market. From Eq. (10) we have 






λκ κ λκ κ
/ ) ( ) (
) (




































































Note that this condition is the discrete counterpart of the condition in Proposition 2a 
on market price. So, if competition policy results in an increase in the number of 
firms, the sales of incumbent firms and the market price falls, resulting in lower 
profits for the incumbent firms. Evidently, as a firm’s operating profits are 
proportional to the square of output, which is falling as inefficiency (marginal cost) 
rises, the profits of the new entrants are lower than for the incumbent firms.  
This brings us to the issue of the viability of firms. Since we arranged the 
firms in increasing inefficiency (rising marginal costs), we know that sales fall as the 
index i increases. If there are N firms active in the market, we refer to the N
th firm as 
the ‘marginal’ firm. If output is positive for the marginal firm, it is also positive for all 
other firms. Since equilibrium profits are  i i i F bx − =
2 π , the impact of fixed costs on 
firm viability is simple and well-known (i.e., it strengthens the positive output 
criterion). Hence, we follow Neary (2007) in putting fixed costs equal to zero for 
simplicity from now on. This gives Proposition 3. 
 
Proposition 3 (Viability of the marginal firm): In the absence of capacity 
constraints, in a market with N firms, the marginal firm’s output  N x  i s  
positive if, and only if, the following condition holds:  λκ κ / ) ( ) 1 ( − < + a N N . 
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Substituting  N i =  in the firm output expression of Eq. (10) gives 
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Evidently, the condition given in Proposition 3 is slightly weaker than that given in 
Proposition 2a for a rise in the number of firms to lower market price. This 
substantially limits the possible range for which a rise in the number of firms might 
lead to a higher market price, as illustrated in Figure 4. 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
For a numerical example, Figure 4 illustrates the quadratic function of N determining 
if the price level falls if N rises (Proposition 2a) and the quadratic function of N 
determining if output of the marginal firm is positive. Clearly, the curves are almost 
identical. In fact, the difference between the points of intersection with the horizontal 
axis depends solely on the value of  λκ κ / ) ( − a , which ranges from zero to infinity. 
The maximum intersection difference of one firm is provided for by  0 / ) ( = − λκ κ a . 
As  ∞ → − λκ κ / ) (a  (i.e., as  0 ↓ λ ), the difference in intersection becomes zero. In 
principle, therefore, a rise in the number of firms always leads to a lower market 
price, except possibly for the market entry of the last firm.
10 These considerations 
allow us to determine the equilibrium number of firms if markets are liberalized. This 
provides Proposition 4. 
                                                 
10 In addition to the difference in intersection with the horizontal axis of the two curves as illustrated in 
Figure 4, which depends only on  λκ κ / ) ( − a , we are dealing with the integer constraint and the price 
level if there are N firms and N-1 firms, respectively. The price level depends not only on  λκ κ / ) ( − a , 
but also on the individual parameter set ( λ , ,k a ). Several attempts so far have not provided an example 
in which the price level actually rises as the last firm with positive output enters. Clearly, a small fixed 
cost would also eliminate this theoretical possibility.     20
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium number of firms): If market liberalization leads to 
firm entry as long as profits are positive, the equilibrium number of firms 
without capacity constraints, 
* N  say, is given by 
( ) λκ κ / ) ( 4 1 5 . 0 5 . 0 int
* − + + − = a N .  
The equilibrium number of firms 
* N  rises if (a) the market size as measured 
by a rises, (b) the market inefficiency as measured by κ  falls, and (c) the 
marginal cost increment as measured by λ  falls. 
 
The equilibrium number of firms follows trivially from solving the viability condition 
in Proposition 3 and imposing the integer constraint. The impact of the various market 
forces on the equilibrium number of firms is straightforward. Without capacity 
constraints, liberalization of the European natural gas market is likely to produce what 
the EU is claiming it will produce: a lower price. The question is, though, whether this 
conclusion can be sustained after the introduction of our Assumption 3: capacity 
constraints. 
 
Rising inefficiency with capacity constraints 
The model introduced above is a stylized description of the European natural gas 
market (or of any other market with rising marginal costs). The model gives 
intuitively plausible results. However, as noted in Section 2, we argue that this 
benchmark provides an incomplete description of energy markets, generally, and gas 
markets, particularly, as the above specification fails to capture capacity constraints. 
Energy sources, including natural gas, are found in specific geographical places, each 
of which faces capacity constraints. New fields can only be developed at increasing 
marginal costs. These constraints can have technical reasons, leading to a maximum   21
amount of energy that can be harvested in a given time period. The constraints can be 
of political origin as well. For instance, the Dutch government does not want to 
deplete the Slochteren gas field too quickly in order to safeguard future gas supply in 
the Netherlands. For whatever reason, capacity restraints are important. This is why 
we will now introduce Assumption 3, to explore the consequences of capacity 
restraints vis-à-vis the results derived from the without-constraints model.  
  Figure 5 illustrates our line of reasoning. For illustration purposes, we 
introduce two firms in the market only. As above, the second firm has higher marginal 
costs (MC) than the first firm, indicated by the line MC firm 2 that lies above MC firm 
1. So, firm 1 has a competitive advantage over firm 2. If firm 1 is faced with a 
capacity constraint, x , two situations can occur: the constraint is binding, or it is not. 
In the latter case, the analysis above holds for two firms. To the contrary, Figure 5 
illustrates what happens if the constraint is binding. Firm 1 can supply x  units of 
goods before the constraint becomes binding. The less efficient firm 2 is clever 
enough to realize firm 1’s capacity constraint. Consequently, it recognizes that the 
market price is now determined in the residual market, indicated in Figure 5 by the 
leftward shift of market demand by the amount  x . 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
Note that firm 2 is a monopolist in the residual market (i.e., it does not face 
competition from capacity-constrained firm 1), and acts accordingly. The point of 
intersection of firm 2’s marginal cost curve with the residual market’s marginal 
revenue curve determines the optimal output level for firm 2 (here 5 units). The price 
level in the residual market (4.5) is equal to the price level in the market as a whole 
(as firm 1 is able to charge the same price). Although, at face value, there are two 
firms active in the market, the market price is actually determined by the monopoly   22
behavior of firm 2 in the residual market. Consequently, the competitive pressure in 
the market is less severe than one would think by focusing on the number of active 
firms in the market per se.  
  Naturally, it must be profitable for both firms to be active in the market. As 
firm 2 is the least efficient of the two firms, this implies that firm 2’s profits must be 
positive. If, on the contrary, firm 2’s profits are not positive, then firm 1 will be a 
monopolist in the market (again, also in this case the – optimal – output of the 
monopolist can or cannot be restricted by the capacity restraint). The illustration in 
Figure 5 already suggests that markets with capacity restraints can be different from 
markets as analyzed above, because prices are determined in residual markets by 
firms that have higher marginal costs. In general, one expects higher prices than in 
markets that do not face firm-level capacity restraints. We now turn to the formal 
analysis of supply-constrained firms in a more general Cournot competition setting. 
Suppose that there are, again, N firms active in the market and that the first n 
(most efficient) firms face an identical capacity constraint x .
11 Residual market 











If we define  x bn a an − ≡  and  n N Nn − = , we can use the general Cournot solution 
given in Eq. (8) to determine equilibrium price and production in the residual market. 
This gives 
 
                                                 
11 We introduce this simplifying assumption to keep the calculus tractable. This assumption does not 
affect the main outcomes of our model.   23
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The cost structure if n firms are capacity-constrained and  n N  are active in the residual 
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Note the similarities and differences between Eqs (10) and (10’). This implies that the 
propositions – and solutions – derived in our benchmark model have a natural 
correspondence to the model introduced here. We will therefore not restate the 
                                                 
12 Note that i is the index in the residual market. So, it corresponds to firm i+n in the original market. 
13 In the formulae, sometimes  n κ  is used, and sometimes κ . This is not a mistake.   24
propositions of the without-constraints model for the model with capacity restraints. 
Table 2 compares the equilibrium outcome of the two models. 
[Insert Table 2 and Figure 6 about here] 
Figure 6 illustrates the impact of the firm-level capacity constraint Assumption 3 on 
the rising inefficiency model equilibrium. In both panels, the horizontal axis shows 
the capacity constraint faced by individual firms. Panel a illustrates the effects of 
capacity constraints on market price and output, while panel b shows the effects of 
capacity constraints on the number of firms active in the market. For comparison, the 
panels also indicate price and quantity (panel a) and the number of firms (panel b) in 
the model without capacity constraints. Going from right to left in the panels, we 
observe the following: 
1.  If the capacity constraint is not binding for any firm, the equilibria in both 
models coincide.  
2.  As the restraint becomes tighter, initially one and subsequently more firms 
become capacity-constrained. This lowers competitive pressure, and thus 
raises the market price and lowers the quantity produced, initially without 
affecting the number of firms active in the market.  
3.  As the constraint becomes tighter still, new entry into the market by less 
efficient firms becomes viable. At the same time, more firms become 
capacity-constrained. Consequently, competitive pressure is determined in the 
residual market by an ever-decreasing number of firms (see panel b; the 
difference between the dashed and solid line). This further raises market price 
and lowers market quantity (panel a). 
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Before continuing with a more general discussion of the capacity-constrained rising 
inefficiency model, our main findings are summarized in Proposition 5. 
 
Proposition 5 (Capacity constraints and (residual) competition): Introducing 
capacity constraints in markets with rising inefficiency results in (a) higher 
market price and lower market output and (b) less competitive pressure (fewer 
firms active in the residual market), despite (potentially) more firms in the 
market as a whole. 
 
We focus attention on proving that capacity constraints lead to higher market prices 
and lower quantities as this suffices to simply illustrate the second point of 
Proposition 5 (lower competitive pressure, despite potentially more firms in the 
market) by means of an example, as we have done above. For ease of reference, Eq. 
(11) restates the equilibrium market price P without capacity constraints and Pn the 
market price if the n most efficient firms are capacity-constrained. 
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where the last equality follows from Eq. (10). Therefore, if firm 1 is effectively 
capacity-constrained, the equilibrium market price is higher.
14 To complete the proof, 
we show that a similar procedure can be used inductively such that in general 
n n P P ≥ +1  if firm  1 + n  is effectively capacity-constrained. Note that 
, 1 , 1 1 − = − = + + n n n n N N x b a a  and  λκ κ κ 2 1 + = + n n . To determine a condition such 
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From equation (10) it follows that  n n P P ≥ +1  if firm  1 + n  is effectively capacity-
constrained. 
 
                                                 
14 Indeed, one can note that the unconstrained market equilibrium price can also be written as P0.   27
  So, the introduction of capacity constraints (Assumption 3) in a Cournot 
competition model (Assumption 1) with a rising inefficiency supply rank 
(Assumption 2) changes the market outcomes completely. Without capacity 
constraints, we had price decreases if N increases, as claimed by the EU; in contrast, 
with capacity constraints, a larger N will generate price increases, as prices are 
determined in the residual market. Note that our model is silent about the dynamic 
effects of liberalization. For one, our model ignores all kinds of issues related to 
dynamic competition, such as innovation and security. Moreover, with free entry, 
price will increase less than it would do without liberalization. The point we want to 
make here, though, is twofold: 
1.  The number of firms alone is not very informative about the extent of 
competition, as many other market conditions may frustrate the ceteris paribus 
competition-increasing effect of a larger number of competitors. 
2.  Indeed, with the “right” assumptions in place, an increasing number of firms 
may generate higher rather than lower prices, as is likely to be the case in the 
EU’s natural gas industry. 
 
Before concluding, we would like to discuss a few interesting by-product results of 
our model in the next section. 
 
5. Further Discussion 
Individual firm production 
Figure 7 illustrates the impact of firm-level capacity constraints on the production 
level of individual firms. By the (linear) ordering of inefficiency and in the absence of 
capacity constraints, firm 1 produces most, followed by firm 2, equidistantly followed   28
by firm 3, et cetera. This continues until the (profit) viability restraint becomes 
binding. In the example of Figure 7, this leads to 11 firms active in the market, as 
illustrated in the right-hand part of the figure.  
[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
Going from right to left in the Figure 7 (as the capacity restraints become tighter), we 
note that there are three groups of firms: 
1.  The most efficient firm 1 is confronted with a monotonic decline in output 
once the restraint is binding and becomes tighter.  
2.  There is a range of intermediately efficient firms i (in the example, firms 2-11) 
for which the output level rises as the capacity constraint becomes tighter for 
its more efficient competitors { } 1 ,.., 1 − i , until the constraint becomes binding 
for the firm itself. From then on, output declines monotonically with the 
tighter constraint.  
3.  There is a range of inefficient firms i (in the example, firms 12-72; only firms 
12-15 are shown in the figure) for which production is initially not viable (so 
output is zero), then becomes viable, from which point on production rises as 
the capacity constraint becomes tighter for its more efficient competitors 
{} 1 ,.., 1 − i , until the constraint becomes binding for the firm itself. From then 
on, output declines monotonically with the tighter constraint.  
 
Conclusion: tighter capacity restraints ensure that a larger share of market output is 
produced by less efficient firms, which drives up market price and lowers output. 
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Individual firm profit 
The owners of individual firms are, of course, more interested in the bottom line – 
that is, in profit rather than production levels. Using the same example as above, 
Figure 8 illustrates the profit levels of the individual firms. In the absence of capacity 
constraints and without fixed costs, profits are proportional to the square of 
equilibrium production (
2
i i bx = π ), implying that the respective profit levels at the 
right-hand side of the figure are not linear, but rather based on a quadratic function. 
[Insert Figure 8 about here] 
Going from right to left in the Figure 8 (as the capacity restraints become tighter), we 
note that there are now (roughly) four groups of firms: 
1.  The most efficient firm 1 is confronted with a monotonic decline in profits if 
the constraint becomes more binding. 
2.  There is a range of intermediately efficient firms i (in the example, firms 2-7) 
that are confronted with a rise in profits as the capacity constraint becomes 
tighter for its more efficient competitors{ } 1 ,.., 1 − i , until the constraint 
becomes binding for the firm itself. From then on, profits decline with the 
tighter constraint.
15   
3.  There is a range of less efficient firms i (in the example, firms 8-11) that are 
confronted with rising profits as the capacity constraint becomes tighter for its 
more efficient competitors{ } 1 ,.., 1 − i , even if the constraint becomes binding 
for them, up to a firm-specific optimal point. Clearly, there is no incentive for 
these firms to invest in capacity within this range.  
                                                 
15 Although its profits are maximized at the point where the capacity constraint becomes binding for 
firm 7, its profits do not decline monotonically from then on as the constraint tightens (due to integer 
considerations) – hence the loose term “roughly” in parentheses in the main text.     30
4.  There is a range of inefficient firms i (in the example, firms 12-72; only firms 
12-15 are shown in the figure) for which production is initially not viable (so 
output is zero), then becomes viable, from which point on profits rise as the 
capacity constraint becomes tighter for its more efficient competitors 
{} 1 ,.., 1 − i , even if the constraint becomes binding for them, up to a firm-
specific optimal point.  
 
Conclusion: except for the most efficient firm, tighter capacity restraints imply higher 
firm profits for firm-specific ranges of capacity restraints. Within that range, firms 
have no incentive to invest in capacity. In general, the incentive to expand capacity is 
higher for the most efficient firms.  
 
Rising market demand 
The impact of rising market demand on price, quantity and the number of active firms 
is illustrated in Figure 9. Here, the economic intuition is fairly straightforward. If 
market demand is low (at the left-hand side of the figure), the capacity constraint is 
not binding, implying that the equilibrium of the with-constraints model is identical to 
that of without-constraints one. As demand rises, the production level increases and so 
does the price level. At this stage, the rising price level reflects two separate forces. 
On the one hand, a rise in demand parameter a leads to a linear increase in price given 
the number of firms N (as  ) 1 /( 1 / + = ∂ ∂ N a P ). On the other hand, the rising demand 
level allows for the entry of new firms, which increases competition and lowers price 
(see Proposition 2a). The net effect is a concave increase in price, as can be seen in 
Figure 9a. As demand rises further, the capacity constraint becomes binding for the 
most efficient firms (first firm 1, then firms 1 and 2, et cetera). From then on, the   31
reduced competitive pressure in the residual market for the unconstrained firms leads 
to significantly higher prices (and thus lower quantities) than in the absence of 
capacity constraints. Note that the number of firms in the residual market is virtually 
constant (five firms, in the example), as is clear from Figure 9b. 
[Insert Figure 9 about here] 
Cost inefficiency 
Figure 10 illustrates the impact of generally rising costs as measured by the 
inefficiency parameter κ . At the intuitively obvious level, in the absence of capacity 
constraints, rising costs (higher inefficiency) leads to higher prices, lower quantities, 
and less competitive pressure as the number of firms declines.  
[Insert Figure 10 about here] 
At the less intuitively obvious level, three important observations can be made: 
1.  The equilibrium market deviation of price and quantity between the model 
with and without capacity constraints is maximized at intermediate levels of 
cost inefficiency, as can be seen in Figure 10a. When cost inefficiency is 
either very high or very low, the equilibrium of the with-constraints coincides 
with that of the without-constraints one. With very high costs, the market is 
ultimately served by an unconstrained monopolist. With very low costs, the 
number of firms active in the market increases in conjunction with competitive 
pressure to ultimately ensure that no firm is capacity-constrained.  
2.  The equilibrium number of constrained firms is maximized at low-
intermediate levels of cost inefficiency, as is visualized in Figure 10b.  
3.  There can be equilibria where all firms active in the market are capacity-
constrained, as reflected in the horizontal segments for price and quantity in 
Figure 10a. In these cases, residual market demand is so low that entry and   32
production by the next most efficient firm is not viable and price is determined 
by the production level of all the constrained firms (hence the horizontal 
segments). In these cases, the total number of firms coincides with the number 
of constrained firms in Figure 10b. 
 
The appendix shows that the impact of the cost increase parameter λ  on the market 
equilibrium is quite similar to that of the general inefficiency parameter κ . 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we illustrate that it is very likely that liberalization of the European 
natural gas industry will not lead to lower prices and higher quantities, but will rather 
be associated with higher prices and lower volumes. This conclusion follows from 
selecting, we believe, the appropriate model from the many available in IO 
economics. In the end, after all, it is the behavior of market players that determines 
the outcomes (cf. Ellis, Bowitz and Roland, 2000). Understanding the likely impact of 
a policy intervention in the marketplace requires, first, the careful identification of the 
key conditions that characterize the market at hand. Only then, the appropriate model 
can be selected. We argue that the European natural gas market is characterized by 
three key conditions: (1) imperfect competition of the Cournot oligopoly type with 
product homogeneity; (2) (potential) gas suppliers that can be ranked from high to 
low efficiency; and (3) capacity constraints for each and every (potential) gas 
supplier. Starting from this set of three essential conditions, we develop an IO model 
of competition that reveals that subsequent entry of more inefficient firms will induce 
higher prices, rather than lower ones, contrary to what the EU’s rhetoric wants the 
public to believe. In terms of static efficiency, for sure, the net effect of liberalization   33
is likely to be more moderate price increases than the ones that would occur without 
liberalization. However, notwithstanding market liberalization, price will increase 
rather than increase. 
  Of course, we presented a stylized model of competition. This is inevitable in 
this type of work. Although we believe that our stylized representation captures the 
essence of the real-world natural gas market in Europe, further work can focus on 
developing more fine-grained models of competition. For example, we ignored the 
chain nature of this industry, with separate markets for production, transportation, 
storage, trade and distribution. As we argued above, this is justified in our case 
because the key constraints and the key inefficiencies are located in the production 
part of the natural gas industry’s value chain. However, to really understand the subtle 
dynamics in the European natural gas industry – and other energy markets, for that 
matter – and the differential impact of (de)regulation, other IO models may be 
developed that can better handle other issues, such as the rent distribution across the 
different parts of the value chain, the impact of different liberalization regimes across 
Member States, or the higher-level EU – supply country bargaining (see, e.g., Jamasb, 
Pollitt and Triebs, 2008, on gas transmission). A final future research issue we would 
like to emphasize is the move toward more dynamic models, introducing elements of 
innovation and investment (cf. Castro-Rodriquez, Marín and Siotis, 2009). Doing so 
would endogenize capacity constraints and efficiency levels, two of the key 
determining features of the European natural gas industry. 
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Appendix  
The figure below illustrates that the impact of the cost increase parameter λ  on the 
market equilibrium is quite similar to that of the general inefficiency parameter κ . 
 
Figure A: Impact of cost increase parameter λ  
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# constrained firms, 
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# firms, no cap constraint
 
Parameters:  5 . 0 ; 15 ; 0 ; 1 ; 1 = = = = = κ a F b x . Note that the four horizontal parts indicated by solid 
sections for price and quantity with capacity constraints in panel a identify sections where all firms 
active in the market are capacity-constrained.   38
Table 1: Future gas export potential for Europe 
 
Countries  Year 2005  Year 2010  Year 2020  Year 2030 
  304 bcm  447 bcm  619 bcm  695 bcm 
Algeria 57  81  110  115 
Norway  81 94 95  100 
Russia  and  Central  Asia  139 166 196 207 
 
Source: Hafner (2008). 
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Table 2: Rising costs solution with and without capacity restraints 
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Note: subscript n indicates that the first n firms face a capacity constraint; see the text for parameters.   40
Figure 1: Predicted gas supply cost curve for the EU15 in 2020 (source: Hafner, 2008) 
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Figure 2: Estimated gas cost curve for the EU15 in 2020 
Gas supply cost curve to EU15 for 2020 (additional volumes)
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Figure 3: European demand for natural gas 
Source: DRI WEFA 2002 European Gas Storage Study (2002). 
 
Source: DRI WEFA 2002 European Gas Storage Study (2002). 
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Figure 4: Falling market prices and positive production 
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Figure 6: Impact of firm-level capacity constraint on equilibrium 
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Parameters:  4 . 0 ; 5 . 0 ; 0 ; 1 ; 15 = = = = = λ κ F b a .   46
Figure 7: Capacity constraints and production 
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Parameters:  2 . 0 ; 5 . 0 ; 0 ; 1 ; 15 = = = = = λ κ F b a ; dashed lines indicate firms not viable without 
capacity constraints.   47
Figure 8: Capacity constraints and profits 



































Parameters:  2 . 0 ; 5 . 0 ; 0 ; 1 ; 15 = = = = = λ κ F b a ; dashed lines indicate firms not viable without 
capacity constraints.   48
Figure 9: Impact of demand parameter a on equilibrium 
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Figure 10: Impact of inefficiency parameter κ  
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Parameters:  2 . 0 ; 15 ; 0 ; 1 ; 1 = = = = = λ a F b x . Note that the four horizontal parts indicated by solid 
sections for price and quantity with capacity constraints in panel a identify sections where all firms 
active in the market are capacity-constrained. 
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